AÜSTÜACT "Cybernetic
Analysis of a Simulated International Threat System" is a statement of the principles and procedures governing the design, construction, execution and analysis of a simulated international threat system. These principles and procedures address themselves to: (1) Lhe application of cybernetics to threat research specifically, and international relations research generally; (2) the research utility of an expanded notion of threat, namely "situational threat"; and, (3) the use of event data in the simulation of synthetic international futures. The approach adopted to explore these issues is to usk experimental subjects in a simulated context to monitor, and where possible, control a synthetic international threat system. The central question is to determine if subjects can recogn'ze situational Ihreats in an international event stream, and if so, hew do they act to avert a potentially ruinous state of affairs. A description of the simulated future, known as TkASS (for Threat Recogniton and Analysis Simulated System) is provided and the relation between cybernetic notions of control and self-regulat ion and simulated futures is discussed. The argument is advanced that cybernetics and systems analysis techniques are particularly well suited to the analysis of complex systems which ari constantly changing.
•-- What is the relationship between the subjects' personality structure and (1) the acts they undertake to avert states of future undesirabi11ty, (2) their recognition of situational threats, and (3) their perception of the event flow and the other participants' behavior? This battery of questions constitutes a formidable group any one of which could be independently investigated, ^ut In a man-machine simulation where the analyst has the advantage of a higher degree of control than he might have In a field study for example, it is possible to permit and handle this level of complexity. Furthermore, these questions are based on the assumption that the answers are constantly changing as the synthetic future is unfolded. Cybernetics, as a method for the analysis of complex systems.
Is designed to handle both the complexity and change this situation creates. It uses the difference (i.e., the change) of one state from Its preceeding state as the basic unit of cybernetic inquiry. The principles of cybernetics inherent
In the design and analysis of this simulated, synthetic threat system (referred to as the Threat Recognition and Analysis Simulated System, or TRASS) treat the recognition that one state of TRASS is different than another, or has changed into another state, as the most fundamental analytic construct. Whether experimental subjects can recognize change, especially when the difference between one state and its successive states reflects deterioration, and If they can, "when". Is the crux of the Inqui ry. Is based on the probability of moving from the present condition to the next condition.
Step 6:
The new future is then transmitted to the subjects and the process repeats itself until two years of future have elapsed.
Data Management and Analysis
A voluminous aiiount of data will he generated during this man-machine simulation. The purpose of a highly Interactive time-sharing procedure is not only to handle the problems of inter-subject exchange, and futures presentation, but to probe for additional subjective insights, and to record, for future analysis, the entire simulation. The types of data recorded Include:
(1) the synthetic future as input, (stimulus) and the subjects' event-Interaction as output (response);
(2) the sequence of event-interaction between subjects, (protocol);
(3) the overjll interaction behavior of the subjects as a triad; (4) the form and content of all communication between subjects, especially during negotiationj;
^-.
(5) the subjective evaluations of the synthetic future (generated In the Reports) and perceptions of the strategies and tactics employed by the subjects (via PROBES during the simulation);
(u) the socio-economic backgrounds of each subject; and, (D) to an absorbing disturba trajectory (F), and finally, to a new difference between an accelerated and a the increased speed (in time) at which passes through its states. The probab allows for the system's equifinalit intervals are arrived at probabilis before, each new interval of futur tic, has pre-designed 1 i ty. l.'hether a state i s probabi1istic, but the system actually The unconstrained, : A --> B --> C --> D causes the system to to a new steady state activated, the entire ted TRASS follows the trajectory of steady to the lul1 (c) to a nee (E) to a downward steady state (A). The determinate TRASS is the accelerated TRASS i1ity factor of TRASS y.
Condi tions wi thin tically. As mentioned e 1s allocated on the The perception testing, whose importance has also been mentioned previously, is primarily designed to -ive a time series account of the way Ss view the dynamics of the simulation. Through a battery of questions, the objective is to determine the changes In the Ss view of: 1) the event flow, 2) the situational threat, 3) his own strate-y, U) the strategy of the other subjects, and 5) the goals he ascribes by switches. And the more time that el a simulation, the more TUASS becomes "infested behavioral inputs of the experimental consequently, the longer they monitor and intera system, the more they are actually looking at The degree to which Tf'<AbG is self-regul at i ng is d the degree to which the subjects exert restrai own behavior. havior is elat ionshi n a strict the system lution,--i t ing are the he subjects system from gh behavior pses in the " with the subjects; ct wi th the themselves, ependent on nt on thei r TKASS, as a simulated makes no pretext of having a however, based on a set of comfortably ascribed to some system. These assumptions are the following assertions.
(1) The arrangement of international threat system, real world referent. It is, assumptions which could be states of the international numerous, but would include nation-state actors reflects a high degree of inter-depenaence and
(2) The arranceuent of actors can be meani ngf u My described as a "system" and using the concepts of systems theory. (Beal, 1974) (3) The international system periodically experiences conditions which can be treated as "situationally threatening" to one or all of the actors in the system.
(.k) An international threat system will in all likelihood, not emerge "ex nihilo," but will evolve out of a context of antagonism and conflict (5) It is reasonable to suggest these antagonisms will emit signals or warnings which can be detected by a careful observer wi th sped al skills.
(u) An international threat system has a dynamic all its own, and once permitted to unfold, will, if unabated, terminate in ruin for all concerned.
(7) There are no well recognized "switches" which can be thrown to control or regulate an International threat system; and there is no recognized authority responsible for control. (11) Therefore actors are forced to comb out "info nation" about how their behavior affects tne system.
(12) The more actors attempt to exert control over an international threat system, then the more they are looking at themselves and their own behavior in the stream of future International events. (18) The purposes for monitoring and controlling can be highly varI able,"complex and changing.
Cut they are invariably connected in t ie final analysis with stability, the state of least stress, and survival, the state of maximum physiological order. They differ from the latter in just a few basic respects: (1) they bring a larger volume of projected data into use, (2) they utilize to a far greater extent computerized files and data management, selection, and retrieval procedures, (3) they emphasize more heavily the processes through which international system changes occur, (U) they impose heavier requirements of analysis and decisional judgment on the participants in gamirg exercises and (5) 
Appendix B
The Normal and Inverted Protocol Values
The protocol value plays a major role In determining whether TRASS determinate transformation wi11 play-out. The simple rule for this determinate is: the higher the protocol value, then the higher the probability of constraining the system. The normal and inverted protocol tables are necessary to allow cooperation as well as conflict to constrain TRASS. A system where only cooperative acts constrain would be unrealistic and inappropriate. Conflict protocols constrain TRASS under the following conditions: (1) whenever all three superpowers attempt to constrain the behavior of another actor in the system; (2) whenever two of three superpowers attempt to constrain the aggressive behavior of the third superpower; (3) whenever one superpower acts to constrain any actor In the system and Is unopposed by the other superpowers; U) whenever acts of a conflictual nature are taken by one superpower and unopposed by the other in the upward, crisis or systemic disturbance status to curtail an escalating trend; (5) whenever itemU) is conducted by two of the superpowers and opposed by the third; and, (6) during the last days of the crisis state and last two time intervals of the systemic disturbance state.
41<
The Theoretically, the steady state could jo on indefinitely. 
Accelerated

3.
Like the steady state, the upward trajectory has four alternative paths: high acceleration, acceleration, constraint and high constraint.
Determinate Upward Diagonal
k.
The determinate upward trajectory is a constantly increasing volume mean. The increases conform to the rates characterized by the diagona' depicted in Figure 2 . The proportion of conflict to cooperation also changes.
-■ ____-___. 
43<
Proportionately more confllctual acts are present In the latter intervals of future than in the initial ones.
5.
If permitted to play-out, the determinate upward state covers eight tim? Intervals, B. The upward state is a situational threat; Its increased volume and proportion of conflict Is threatening and its path points to a more ruinous future.
Constrained Trajectories 7, High constraint and constraint, both reduce the volume of events and the proportion of conflict in the event flow.
8.
Each reverses the projection of the state and returns the system to a new steady state. It can not be constrained or accelerated.
It conforms to the empirical observation In many crisis studies that there Is a "lull before the storm" phenomena in International relations. 
